Abstract. A constructive theory of randomness for functions, based on computational complexity, is developed, and a pseudorandom function generator is presented. This generator is a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm that transforms pairs (g, r), where g is any one-way function and r is a random k-bit string, to polynomial-time computable functionsf,: { 1, . . . , 2') + { 1, . . . , 2kl. Thesef,'s cannot be distinguished from random functions by any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that asks and receives the value of a function at arguments of its choice. The result has applications in cryptography, random constructions, and complexity theory.
Introduction
What is meant by saying that certain functions "'behave randomly"?
In this paper we provide a precise answer to the above question. We then present an efficient way to construct functions that behave randomly, if one-way functions exist. We conclude by demonstrating applications of our construction.
Randomness has attracted much attention in the second half of this century. However, most of the previous work focused on measuring the randomness of strings.
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In Kolmogorov Com@exity [ 10, 13, 22, 24-26, 30, 34, 37 , and 421 the measure of randomness of a string is the length of its shortest description. Kolmogorovrandomness is an inherent property of individual strings. This approach is nonconstructive and far from being applicable to pseudorandom string generation. Notably, the set of Kolmogorov-random strings is nonrecursive.
Interesting generalizations of Kolmogorov complexity have been considered in [ 11, [ 191, [36] , and [38] . Here a string s is "random" if it cannot be produced by a program that is both efficient (polynomial-time) and shorter than s. The approach remains far from pseudorandom number generation. In fact no efficient algorithm that uses less than k truly random bits can output a k-bit string random in the above sense.
Recently, a constructive approach to the randomness of strings, based on computational complexity, has emerged [8, 411 . In this approach a set S of strings is polynomial random (poly-random) if programs that run in polynomial time lead to identical results when fed either with elements randomly selected in S or with elements randomly selected in the set of all strings. This approach is constructive in the following way: There exists a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm that, upon input of a k-bit string, outputs a poly(k)-bit string, such that, if one-way functions exist, then the set of all output strings is poly-random.
In this paper we further develop this latter approach by introducing a constructive theory of randomness forfunctions. In particular,
(1) We introduce a computational complexity measure of the randomness of functions: Loosely speaking, we call a function poly-random if no polynomialtime algorithm, asking for the values of the function at arguments of its choice, can distinguish a computation during which it receives the true values of the function, from a computation during which it receives the outcome of independent coin flips. Notice the analogy with the Turing Test for intelligence. (2) Assuming the existence of one-way functions we present an algorithm for constructing poly-random functions. Our work was motivated by an open problem of [9] and [7] .,
In the rest of this introduction we informally discuss the notion of a poly-random collection: a set of functions easy to select and evaluate, which achieve randomness with respect to polynomial-time computation. We compare this new notion with the previously considered notions of one-way functions and cryptographically strong pseudorandom bit generators (CSB generators).
1.1. POLY-RANDOM COLLECTIONS. Let Ik denote the set of all k-bit strings. Consider the set Hk of all functions from zk into Ik. Note that the cardinality of Hk is 2k.2k. Thus, to specify a function in Hk, we would need k2k bits: an impractical task even for a moderately large k. Assume now that for all integer k one randomly selects a subset & c Hk of cardinality 2k. Let A denote the collection (&I. This way each function in Dk has a unique k-bit index. However, with probability 1, there is no polynomial-time algorithm that, given the k-bit index of a function -fE Hk and x E Ik, evaluates f(x).
Our goal is to make "random functions" accessible for applications. That is, to construct functions that can be easily specified and evaluated and yet cannot be distinguished from functions chosen at random in Hk. Thus we restrict ourselves to choosing functions from a multiset Fk (whose elements are in Hk), where the collection F = (Fk) has the following properties:
( Informally, one-way functions are functions that are easy to compute, but hard to invert for some nonnegligible fraction of the instances. We construct random functions from any one-way function. This confirms the great potential present in the notion of a one-way function. However, this power needs to be carefully brought out.
Although the inverse of a one-way function is somewhat unpredictable, this does not mean that it is random. In fact, all functions that are currently believed to be one-way satisfy various algebraic identities (e.g., the Rivest-Shamir-Adelman (RSA) function [33] is a multiplicative permutation; thus given its inverse on x and y, one can easily infer its inverse at x . y). This clearly does not happen with truly random functions and in fact will not happen with a function randomly selected from a poly-random collection (FkJ. In particular, our construction hides all the algebraic identities that may be satisfied by the one-way function upon which it is based from any observer with polynomially bounded resources. In fact, the following property holds for poly-random collections:
Randomly choose and fixf~ Fk. If A is now given two numbers in random order, one of which is f(x) and the other a random k-bit number, it cannot guess which of the two isf(x) with probability substantially greater than i.
Thus, iffis selected in a poly-random collection, not only the value offat argument x cannot be computed from the values offat other arguments, but it cannot even be recognized when given! The above test is a complete characterization of polyrandom collections (see Section 4).
1.3 COMPARISON WITH CSB GENERATORS. In this subsection, we address the problem of simulating probabilistic polynomial-time computations so as to save basic resources such as coin tosses and storage. As we shall see, CSB generators allow one to save coin tosses in probabilistic polynomial-time computations, whereas poly-random collections allow one to save both coin tosses and storage in polynomial-time computation with a random oracle.
CSB generators are efficient deterministic programs that stretch a (random) k-bit-long input seed to a k'-bit-long output (pseudorandom) sequence, for some constant t > 0. These sequences are indistinguishable, in polynomial time, from k'-bit-long truly random sequences (see Section 2.1 for a detailed discussion). Thus, we can replace the coin tosses in a probabilistic poly(k)-time computation by the bit sequence generated by a CSB generator on a random k-bit string and still get almost the same results.
We now address the problem of efficiently simulating more complex probabilistic computations: computations with a random oracle. A random oracle [4] is a special case of a random function: it associates the result of a single coin toss to each string. In computing with a random oracle, an algorithm queries the oracle with a string q and receives q's associated bit (denoted b(q)). Since b(q) does not change with time, the algorithm need not store the pair (q, b(q)) but rather query the oracle on q whenever it needs b(q). The advantages of computing with a random oracle are clarified by all the applications listed in Section 5.
A polynomial-time computation that queries a random oracle on k' strings of length k can be trivially simulated using a CSB generator and only k coins (see below). However, this trivial simulation of the oracle requires k'+' bits of storage.
Store a randomly selected k-bit string s and denote by bi the ith bit produced by a CSB generator on input s. Let qi be the ith new query (i.e., a query never asked before). Then set b(qi) = bi, append (an encoding of) qi to a list of past queries, and answer bi. The ordered list of past queries enables us to recognize whether a query has occurred before and, if so, to give the same answer.
Note that the list of past queries is indeed necessary. Such a list may not be significantly compressable (e.g., for randomly selected queries). Thus, in the worst case the simulation requires at least k"' bits of storage.
An interesting property of poly-random collections is that they guarantee the same result for any polynomial-time computation with a random oracle, for k-bit strings, by using only k coin flips and by storing only k bits! This can be done by randomly selecting and storing a k-bit index specifying a function fin a polyrandom collection. The bit associated with each string x will be the first bit off(x).
Sharing Randomness in a Distributed Environment. An additional advantage of poly-random collections is that they enable many parties to share eficiently a random function fin a distributed environment. By sharingfwe mean that, iffis evaluated at different times by different parties on the same argument x, the same value f(x) will be obtained. Such sharing can be achieved by flipping k coins to specify a function fin a poly-random collection. These k bits are communicated to and stored by each processor. No further messages need to be exchanged between the processors to share f:
1.4 NOTATION AND CONVENTIONS. This paper does not deal with Kolmogorov complexity. Whenever we refer to a random element, we mean an element randomly selected from the appropriate set.
Let A be a multiset with distinct elements al, . . . , a,, occurring with multiplicities ml,..., m,, respectively. Then 1 A 1 = ET=, mi. By writing a ER A, we mean that the element a has been randomly selected from the multiset A. That is, an element occurring in A with multiplicity m is chosen with probability m/l A I.
For uniformity of notation, the parameter k, when given as input to any algorithm discussed in this paper, is presented in unary. (We analyze the running time of our algorithms with respect to the length of their input, and some algorithms in this paper have only k as input.) h We chose Turing machines as the basic computational model for this paper. One can easily transform the statements and the proofs of all our results from the Turing machine model to the circuit model. 1.5 ORGANIZATION OF THE PAPER. In Section 2 we briefly recall the basic definitions and results concerning CSB generators and the easy-access open problem. In Section 3 we formally define poly-random collections and show how to construct them given any one-way function. In Section 4 we characterize polyrandom collections as extremely hard prediction problems. In Section 5 we briefly discuss various applications of poly-random collections.
CSB Generators
A pseudorandom number generator is a deterministic and efficient algorithm that stretches a random input number (seed) into a long pseudorandom number sequence. The pseudorandom sequence should have "some" statistical properties present in truly random sequences (e.g., it should have approximately as many O's as 1 's). Many statistical properties of the linear congruential pseudorandom number sequence xj+l = a . Xi + b(mod n) have been studied by Knuth [21] . However, unlike truly random sequences, the next number in a linear congruential sequence can be easily computed from the preceding ones, even when x0, a, b, and n are not given [31] . See also [12] , [20] , and [23] .
Shamir [35] presents a pseudorandom number generator for which computing the next number in the sequence from the preceding ones is as hard as inverting the RSA function. However, though unpredictable, the numbers in such a sequence may not appear "random" (e.g., their high-order bits may be easy to predict). All such problems provably do not arise for CSB generators. [8] introduced the notion of a cryptographically strong pseudorandom bit generator (CSB generator). Let P be a polynomial. A CSB generator G is a deterministic poly(k)-time program that stretches a k-bit-long randomly selected seed into a P(k)-bit-long sequence (called a CSB sequence) that passes all next-bit-tests:
THE NOTION OF A CSB GENERATOR. Blum and Micali
Let P be a polynomial, Sk a multiset' consisting of P(k)-bit sequences and S = Uk Sk. A next-bit-test for S is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm T that on input k and the first i bits in a string s ER Sk outputs a bit b. Let pi denote the probability that b equals the i + 1 st bit of s. We say that S passes the next-bit-test T if, for all polynomials Q, for all sufficiently large k, and for all integers i E [0, P(k));
A more general definition of string randomness has been suggested by Yao [4 I] . ' We use multisets instead of sets since it may be that a CSB generator outputs the same CSB sequence on two different seeds. * In the original version of [8] a fixed E > 0 appeared instead of l/Q(k). The replacement by l/Q(k) was suggested by Yao [41] . This was of crucial importance for proving Theorem 1 [41] .
POLYNOMIAL-TIME STATISTICAL TESTS FOR STRINGS
Definition (Yao) . Let P and PI be polynomials and S = lJk Sk be a multiset of sequences, where Sk consists of P(k)-bit sequences. A polynomial-time statistical test for strings is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm T that takes as input P,(k) strings, each P(k)-bit long, and outputs either 0 or 1. We say that S passes the test T if, for any polynomial Q, for all sufftciently large k, where pf denotes the probability that T outputs 1 on P,(k) randomly selected strings in Sk, and pf denotes the probability that T outputs 1 on P,(k) random bit strings, each of length P(k).
Of special interest is the case in which the polynomial PI(k) is the constant 1, so that the statistical test receives as an input a single string.
The following definition plays an important role in relating the above definitions of randomness. We say that a multiset S = Uk Sk is samplable if there is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that, given as input k, outputs s ER Sk. Actually, only statement (*) explicitly appears in [41] . However, its proof contains all the ideas needed for proving the equivalence of the three conditions of Theorem 1. The reader can derive a proof of Theorem 1 from the proof of Theorem 4 (which can be viewed as a generalization of Theorem 1).
2.3 IMPLEMENTATION OF CSB GENERATORS. Blum and Micali [8] presented an algorithmic scheme for constructing.CSB generators based on a general complexity theoretic assumption (a sketch can be found in Section Al of the Appendix). They also presented the first instance of their scheme based on a specific complexity assumption: the intractability assumption of the discrete logarithm problem (DLP). Namely, if the next bit in the sequences produced by their generator could be predicted with probability greater than $ + t, then there would exist a poly(k, E-') algorithm for solving the DLP for a fraction c of all primes of length k. A more efficient CSB generator based on the DLP can be derived from [28] .
Other instances of CSB generators based on various number-theoretic assumptions have been found. CSB generators based on the quadratic residuosity problem appeared in [41] and [7] . The first CSB generator based on factoring appears in [4 11 . More efficient generators based on factoring have been obtained by a sequence of stronger results [2; 5, 18, 39,] . As pointed out in [40] , the results in [2] imply that the quadratic residuosity generators in [41] and [7] are in fact also based on factoring.
More generally, Yao [41] has shown how to obtain CSB generators if any oneway permutation is given. Levin [27] shows how to obtain CSB generators using a seemingly weaker condition: The existence of one-way functions (defined below).
Definition (Levin) . Let Dk C Ik. Let&: D k + Dk be a sequence of functions and let the function f be defined as follows: f(x) = J&V) if x E Dk. Letf' denote f applied i times. Let 0; G Dk such that y E 0; if y = Y(X) for some x E Dk. fis a one-way function if
(1) fis polynomial-time computable; (2) fis hard to invert; that is, for every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A and for all sufficiently large k, for every 1 I i I k3, A(x) # j?F' (x) for at least a constant fraction of the x E Dk; (3) UDk is samplable. THEOREM 2. (Levin [27] ). There exists a one-wayfunction ifand only ifthere exists a CSB generator.
The above theorem is constructive. Levin shows a particular generator that is a CSB generator if any CSB generator exists. Levin makes use of a construction due to Yao [41] , which is sketeched in Section A2 of the Appendix.
CSB GENERATORS WITH EASY ACCESS.
Notice that, even though a CSB sequence generated with a k-bit-long seed consists of polynomially many (in k) bits, a CSB generator and a seed s define an infinite (ultimately periodic) bitsequence b0, bl, . . . . An interesting feature first present in the generator of Blum et al. [7] is that knowledge of the seed allows easy access to each of the first 2k bits; that is, if log i < k, the ith bit in the string bi can be computed in poly(k) time. This is due to the special one-way permuation on which the security of their generator is based. However, this easily accessible exponentially long bit-string may not appear "random." Blum et al. only prove that any singIe polynomially long interval of consecutive bits in the string passes all polynomial-time statistical tests for strings, provided that squaring mod a Blum-integer3 n is a one-way permutation (over the squares mod n). Indeed, it may be the case that, given b,, . . . , bk and &a+, . . . , bzfi+k, it is easy to compute any other bit in the string.
The easy-access open problem consists of whether easy access to exponentially far away bits in their pseudorandom pad is a "randomness preserving" operation. This problem was posed by Brassard [9] and Blum et al. [7] . The problem was also discussed by Angluin and Lichtenstein [3] . Notice that there is a natural one-to-one correspondence between "randomness preserving" easily accessible k . 2k-bit-long strings and random functions from Ik to Ik. By COnStrWting a poly-random collection F = (Fk), we virtualiy COnStrUCt k . 2k-bit strings (SJ =f( l)f(2) . . . f(2k) ]fE Fk) which can be easily accessed in a "randomness preserving" manner. This practically solves the easy-access problem. In fact, our construction demonstrates a different way to achieve the benefits that a positive answer to the easy-access problem would have provided. Even better, we construct poly-random collections not only if squaring modulo a Blum-integer is a one-way function, but given any one-way function.
Constructing Poly-Random Collections
In this section we show how to construct collections of functions that pass all "polynomially bounded" statistical tests. A collection offunctions F is a collection (FkJ, such that for all k and allfE Fk,f: Ik + Ik.
POLYNOMIAL-TIME STATISTICAL TESTS FOR FUNCTIONS
Definition. A polynomial-time statistical test for functions is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm T that, given k as input and access to an oracle 0, for a function f: Ik + Zk, outputs either 0 or 1. Algorithm T can query the oracle 0~ only by writing on a special query tape some y E Ik and will read the oracle answer f( y) on a separate answer-tape. As usual, 0~ prints its answer in one step.
Let F = (FkJ be a collection of functions. We say that F passes the test T if, for any polynomial Q, for all sufficiently large k;
where pp denotes the probability that T outputs 1 on input k and access to an oracle 0, for a function f ER Fk and p,$' denotes the probability that T outputs 1 when given the input k and access to an oracle 0~ for a function f ER Hk (i.e., a random function). Here the probabilities are taken over all the possible choices of f E Fk or Hk and the internal coin tosses of T.
The above definition can be interpreted as follows: A function f is "judged" to be random depending on its input-output relation. The test T consists of two phases. First it gathers information about f by gettingf's values at arguments of its choice. Then it outputs its "verdict": 0 (if it "thinks" that f ER Fk) or 1 (if it "thinks" that f ER Hk). If the collection F passes the test T, then the output of T when given access to an oracle 0~ gives no information on whether f ER Fk or f ER Hk. In either case Twill output 1 with essentially the same probability.
Passing all polynomial-time statistical tests for functions is an extremely general randomness criterion. For example, suppose that some efficient algorithm A can find dependencies among input-output pairs off 6 Fk; then A can be converted to a statistical test TA that will output 0 upon A's detection of such dependencies (i.e., judging that f ER Fk). Since such dependencies cannot be found when f ER Hk, the collection F = (FkJ will not pass the test TA. (For a more detailed discussion see Section 4.)
We now exhibit a collection F that passes all polynomial-time statistical tests, under the assumption that there exists a one-way function.
3.2 THE CONSTRUCTION OF F. In this section we show how to use a CSB generator to construct a poly-random collection. In other words we show that pseudorandomness for strings implies pseudorandomness for functions. Since a CSB generator can be explicitly constructed if one-way functions exist, so can polyrandom collections.
In particular, our construction utilizes any CSB generator G that stretches a seed x E Ik into the 2k-bit-long sequence G(x) = b'f . . . b&.
Let Sk be the multiset of the 2k-bit sequences output by G on seeds of length k.
Recall that S = lJk Sk passes all polynomial-time statistical tests for strings.
Let x E Zk. By Go(x) we denote the first k bits output by G on input X. That is, We remark that computingf,( y) on inputs x and y requires k -Tk steps, where
Tk denotes the number of steps for computing G(x) on input x E Zk. Also note that the functions in Fk may not be one-to-one.
3.3 THE POLY-RANDOMNESS OF F. The collection F just defined satisfies conditions 1 (indexing) and 2 (poly-time evaluation) of a poly-random collection (see Section 1.1). The main theorem shows that condition 3 (pseudorandomness) is also satisfied.
THEOREM 3 (MAIN THEOREM). Let F be a collection offunctions constructed as in Section 3.2 using a CSB generator G. Then F passes all polynomial-time statistical tests for functions.
PROOF. Let us first give an overview of the proof. We assume, for contradiction, that there exists some probabilistic polynomial-time statistical test for functions T that F does not pass. We then use T to construct a polynomial-time statistical test for strings, AT. We reach a contradiction by showing that the set of CSB sequences produced by G does not pass AT.
Let us consider computations of the statistical test T in which T's queries are answered by one of the following probabilistic algorithms Ai (i = 0, 1, . . . , k) (instead of being answered by an oracle 0,).
Algorithm Ai answers T's queries as follows.5 Let y = y1 y2 . . -yk be a query of T. Then if y is the first query with prefix y, . --y, then Ai selects a string r E Zk at random, stores the pair ( yI . . . yi, r), and answers else G,+, :,dr) Ai retrieves the pair ( yI . -. yi, u) and answers Gy,+,__.,(u).
(Conceptually, algorithm Ai starts with a full binary tree of depth k and stores random k-bit strings in all nodes of level i. In the nodes of succeeding levels, it stores k-bit strings deterministically computed by applying G as follows. If the k-bit string s is stored in an internal node u, then GO(S) is stored in u's left-son and G,(s) is stored in u's right-son. The algorithm answers query q with the string stored in the leaf reachable from the root following the edge path q.) Define pk to be the probability that T outputs 1 when given k as input and its queries are answered by algorithm Ai, 0 5 i 5 k.
Define p[ (pf, respectively) to be the probability that T outputs 1 when given k as input and access to an oracle 0~ for a functionf& Fk (f5 Hk, respectively).
Note that pi = pp and that pi = pf'.
As F is assumed not to pass T, there exists a polynomial Q and infinitely many k so that 1 pf -pf 1 > l/Q(k). Equivalently, 1 p2 -pi 1 > l/Q(k). We denote by K the set of all such k's.
We are now ready to describe the polynomial-time statistical test AT for strings.
Let PI be a polynomial such that the test T makes at most PI(k) queries on input k. On input k E K and a set uk of P,(k) strings, each 2k bits long, the test AT performs a two-stage computation. In the first stage, AT picks i between 0 and k -1 with uniform probability. In stage two, algorithm AT gives k as input to algorithm T and answers T's oracle queries consistently using the set uk as follows.
Assume T writes y = yI . . . yk on the oracle tape.
if y is the first query with prefix yI . . . yi then AT picks the next string in Uk. Let u = uoul be such a string (uou, is the concatenation of u,, and ul, and 1 ~0 1 = 1 u1 1 = k). Then AT stores the pairs ( y, . . . yiO, ~0) and (Yl . . . yil, u,) and answers Gi,,. .&o) if yi+,=O and Gi+z...,&~) if yi+l=l.
else AT retrieves the pair ( y, . . ' yi+I, u) and answers Gyi+2.. .,(u).
Note that, if uk consists of 2k-bit strings output by the CSB generator G on randomly selected k-bit input seeds, then AT simulates a computation of T with oracle Ai. If, instead, uk consists of randomly selected 2k-bit strings, then AT simulates a computation of T with oracle Ai+, .
The probability that AT outputs 1 when Uk is a randomly chosen subset of the 2k-bit strings output by the CSB generator G is C.!zJ (l/k) . pk. On the other hand, the probability that AT outputs 1 when Uk is a randomly chosen subset of all 2k-bit strings, is Cf:, (l/k) -pi+'. When k E K, these probabilities differ by at least (l/k) . 1 pg -pi 1 > l/(k . Q(k)). Thus, the sequences produced by G do not pass the statistical test AT and we reach a contradiction. 0 3.4 GENERALIZED POLY-RANDOM COLLECTIONS. Let P, and Pz be polynomials. In some applications we would like to have random functions from UP, + ZP2(k) (e.g., in hashing we might want functions from Iloo into Ilo). We meet this need by constructing a generalized poly-random collection (F$~~}. The modified construction can be simply described in terms of two different CSB generators: G mapping k bit strings into 2k bit strings and G' mapping k random input bits into Pz(k) pseudorandom bits. For x E Zk the function fX E Fph is defined as follows: on input y E Z p,(k), fX( y) = G'(G,(x)). By a proof similar to that of the Main Theorem, we can prove that the collection, (F$vp2) possesses properties ( 1 )- ( 3) of poly-random collections.
Prediction Problems and Poly-Random Collections
Physics may be viewed as a prediction problem. This problem may seem to be tractable if (1) There is an a priori guarantee that the "laws of nature" are "simple." (2) It is possible to conduct selected experiments. Similarly, in complexity theory, one may conjecture that all functions f that are "simple" (i.e., that are easy to evaluate given some hidden key) can be "approximately inferred" after temporary access to an oracle for J: In this section we show that this is not the case, under the assumption that one-way functions exist.
4.1 FORMAL SETTING. Let F = (FkJ be a collection of functions and A a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm capable of oracle calls. On input k and access to an oracle 0~ for a function fE Fk, algorithm A carries out a computation during which it queries 0, about xl, . . . , Xi. Then algorithm A outputs x E Zk such thatx#x,, . . . . Xj. This x is called the chosen exam. At this point A is disconnected from O/and is presented the two valuesf(x) and y ER Zk in random order. We say that A passes the exam if it correctly guesses which of the two values is f(x). Let Q be a polynomial. We say that A Q-infers the collection F if, given input k, for infinitely many k, it passes the exam with probability at least l/2 + l/Q(k). Here the probability is taken over all the possible choices of fE Fk, the internal coin tosses of A, all possible choices of y, and the random order between f(x) and y.
We say that a collection of functions F can be polynomially inferred if there exist a polynomial Q and a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A that Q-infers F.
Polynomially inferring a collection F is a very weak kind of a prediction problem. However, if one-way functions exist, it is still an infeasible task, as follows from Theorems 3 and 4. PROOF. Assume, first, that there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A that Q-infers the collection F. Then F does not pass the statistical test for functions, TA , described here:
On input k and access to an oracle O,( f ER Fk or f ER Hk), the test TA-invokes the inferring algorithm A with input k. For every query q made by A, the test TA asks 0~ for f(q) and returns the answer to A. Finally, when A outputs the string x as its chosen exam, TA queries 0, on x, randomly picks y E Ik, and returns y and f(x) to A in random order. If A correctly identifies f(x), then TA outputs 1; otherwise TA outputs 0.
For all k, when f ER Hk the probability that TA outputs 1 is exactly 4. On the other hand, for infinitely many k, when f ER Fk the probability that TA outputs 1 is greater than i + l/Q(k). Thus, F does not pass the test TA.
Conversely, assume that F does not pass a statistical test T. That is, there exists a polynomial Q such that for infinitely many k, 1 pf -pr 1 > l/Q(k), where pf (pf, respectively) is the probability that T outputs 1 on input k and access to an Oracle 0~ for f ER Fk (fR ER I&, respectively). Without loss of generality, we may assume that, for infinitely many k, pf -pf > l/Q(k), and let K denote the set of all such k. Also, without loss of generality, during the same computation, T never asks the same query twice and, on input k, asks exactly P(k) queries (for some polynomial P).
We construct a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm AT that uses T as a subroutine and 2 . P(k) . Q(k)-infers F. On input k and access to an oracle O,(f ER Fk), the algorithm AT proceeds as follows. It first chooses i between 0 and P(k) -1 with uniform probability. (We later refer to i as the index.) Next AT invokes T with input k and uses the oracle 0, to answer T's first i queries. When T asks for its i + 1st query, x;+~, then AT outputs Xi+1 as its chosen exam. Upon receiving f(xi+l ) and y, where y ER zk, AT randomly chooses z E (f(Xi+l ), y) and gives z as an answer to query xi+]. Next, algorithm AT continues to answer the queries Xi+2 through xP(k) of T by randomly selected k-bit strings. Finally, T outputs a bit and halts. If T's output was a 0, then AT guesses that z ER Ik; otherwise AI, guesses that z = f(xi+l ).
In analyzing the probability that AT makes a correct guess, the following concept of a (k, i, g)-experiment (where g E Fk) will be useful:
Run T with input k and answer its queries as follows. Let Xj be the jth query of T. if j 5 i, then answer g(Xj); else answer with a random k-bit string.
Let pi be the probability that T outputs 1 in a (k, i, g)-experiment when g ER Fk. Note that p! = pf and pfck) = p[. Let us calculate the probability that AT makes a correct guess on input k E K and access to oracle 0, for f ER Fk. Poly-random collections can not be polynomially inferred.
Remark. Our construction of poly-random collections has a "strengthening effect." Assume that Ftg) is a poly-random collection constructed given the oneway function g. Then the functions in F@ cannot be polynomially inferred, even if g and/or g-' is polynomially inferable.
Cryptographic Applications and Further Improvements
Poly-random collections constitute a very powerful tool in a cryptographic setting. The functions in such collections are easy to select and compute with, but retain all the desired statistical properties of random functions with respect to adversaries that are bounded to polynomial-time computation. This suggests the following methodology for protocol design. First, design a protocol that (magically) uses truly random functions and prove it correct. This step is often very easy. Then, replace the truly random functions by functions randomly selected from a poly-random collection. This replacement will provably maintain all properties of the original protocol with respect to polynomially bounded adversaries. This methodology has provided rigorous solutions to such cryptographic problems as message authentication with time stamping, storageless distribution of secret identification numbers, identifying friend or foe systems, and cryptographically strong hashing. A detailed discussion of these applications is presented in [151.
Levin and Goldreich pointed out in [17a] that poly-random collections can be used to make the Goldwasser-Micali-Rivest [ 171 signature scheme "memoryless." The use of poly-random collections is crucial in the fair contract signing protocol of Ben-Or et al. [6] .
Recently, Luby and Rackoff [29] used poly-random collections to construct collections of poly-random permutations. This result leads to the construction of "ideal private key cryptosystems."
Levin [27] proposed a modification of our poly-random construction, that can be carried out in poly(log k) steps. This implies that, if there exists a CSB generator that works in NC, then there exists a poly-random collection of functions that can be evaluated in NC.
